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Pure reward in a local
scheme is more effective
both for fixed and flexible
incentives
It can drive the entire
population toward a
highly cooperative state
Increasing the efficiency of
the institution can induce
the success of pure reward
A local scheme promotes
group success more
effectively than a global
scheme
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Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the
commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have
demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could
be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy
makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider
the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simulta-
neous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions
with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with
pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population
toward a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently
of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incen-
tives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works
more effectively.
INTRODUCTION
Our society faces many urgent challenges that can be encapsulated as ‘‘the problems of the commons’’,
such as climate change, desertification of land, environmental pollution, and the list can be easily extended
by other examples (Ostrom, 1990). All these pressing problems require us to give up our short-term per-
sonal interests for the benefit of long-term collective success (Rand andNowak, 2013; Tavoni, 2013; Lenton,
2014; Shirado and Christakis, 2020). However, self-interested individuals always prefer their personal inter-
ests which can easily lead to a collective failure; hence, the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ seems to be inevi-
table (Hardin, 1968).
As a paradigm, the public goods game has been commonly used to study such dilemmas characterized by
the frustration between personal and collective interests (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hauert et al., 2002; Szol-
noki et al., 2011; Sasaki et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015; Han et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2019; Ginsberg and Fu,
2019; Domingos et al., 2020; Santos et al., 2021). However, recent research emphasized that the traditional
public goods game does not consider the risk of group failure; hence, the so-called collective-risk social
dilemma game is a more competent tool to grab the essence of the conflict in several cases (Milinski
et al., 2008). An excellent example of this feature is the mitigation effort to prevent climate change
(Schroeder et al., 2012; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Marotzke et al., 2020), which is one of the greatest
public goods dilemmas that we humans face in the history (Inman, 2009).
Recent experimental and theoretical studies concerning collective-risk social dilemmas have revealed that
the risk of collective failure plays an important role in promoting the evolution of cooperation (Milinski
et al., 2008, 2011; Wang et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2010; Santos and Pacheco, 2011; Jacquet et al., 2013;
Wu et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). More precisely, a high risk can significantly enhance the willingness
to cooperate, but cooperation collapses when the risk of failure is low (Santos et al., 2012; Chen et al.,
2012, 2014; Pacheco et al., 2014; Vasconcelos et al., 2014, 2015; Diaz and Moore, 2017). Introducing costly
punishment into the collective-risk social dilemma game can reverse the disadvantage situation under low
risk, even when punishment is voluntary and costly (Vasconcelos et al., 2013). Furthermore, local schemes of
sanctioning can do better than global schemes of institutions in improving the general group achievement,
even when the risk of collective failure is low (Vasconcelos et al., 2013).
Beside punishment (Sigmund et al., 2010), other incentive strategies, like rewarding cooperators or the
simultaneous presence of independent incentives, were also considered by previous works (Hilbe andiScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021 ª 2021 The Author(s).





ArticleSigmund, 2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2013). An intriguing question is whether there exists the optimal relation
of negative and positive incentives that can be maintained when voluntary and costly. In this paper, we
thereby consider a hybrid enforcement strategy which imposes both kinds of incentives on participants
simultaneously in the collective-risk social dilemma game. Accordingly, the positive and negative incen-
tives are simultaneously presented within an incentive strategy, called executor strategy, and executors
both punish defectors and simultaneously reward cooperators with a certain weight.
Our principal goal is to investigate how the proposed executor strategy influences the group achievement
for solving the collective-risk social dilemma and to further find the optimal incentive strategy in the coop-
erative governance of risky commons when institutions are working at a local or global level. Furthermore,
we respectively consider two cases of institutions: when the imposed incentive is fixed, the incentive
amount is independent of the actual number of executor players; while when the imposed incentive is flex-
ible, the incentive amount depends on the actual number of executor players (Sigmund et al., 2010; Sasaki
and Unemi, 2011; Vasconcelos et al., 2013; Szolnoki and Perc, 2015). We stress that in our framework
whether the institutions can be formed depends on the number of executor players in game interactions,
and hence, this setting is different from pervious works (Chen et al., 2015; Góis et al., 2019) which supposed
that the considered centralized institutions are established in advance and can always work stably. In addi-
tion, the incentive budget on cooperators and defectors is not constrained in this work, whereas it is fixed in
previous works (Chen et al., 2015; Góis et al., 2019). Interestingly, we show that independently of the types
of institutions, pure reward strategy can always do better than other combinations of incentives in
improving the level of group achievement in local sanctioning schemes. Besides, we find that this obser-
vation remains valid for flexible incentives in global sanctioning schemes. Furthermore, we reveal that
regardless of the value of risk, a local scheme can promote group success more effectively than a global
scheme, no matter whether the imposed incentives are fixed or flexible.RESULTS
Fixed incentives under a local scheme
We investigate the stationary distribution and the gradient of selection to study the evolutionary dynamics
of cooperators (C), defectors (D), and executors (E) in finite well-mixed populations (Vasconcelos et al.,
2013). The stationary distribution standing for the prevalence in time of each configuration of the entire
population is mapped onto the triangular simplex, in which each dot represents a configuration. The so-
called gradient of selection provides the most likely direction of evolution from a given configuration.
In Figure 1, we show the stationary distribution and the gradient of selection when pure reward strategy
(i.e., a = 1) and pure punishment strategy (i.e., a = 0) are considered, respectively. It suggests that the pop-
ulation will spend a significant time near the CE (C means cooperators and E means executors)-edge of the
triangle simplex, as shown in Figure 1A. Furthermore, most of the arrows in the simplex flow to the inter-
mediate region of CE-edge, indicating that the entire population evolves toward cooperation dominant
states. In Figure 1B, we show that the population will spend most of the time near the configurations in
which a lot of individuals are defectors (Vasconcelos et al., 2013). The comparison of these panels suggests
that pure reward strategy can lead to better outcomes than pure punishment strategy since the population
spendsmost of the time away from theD vertex in the usage of pure reward strategy. In order to qualify this,
we further compute the average group achievement hG values, which denote the average fraction of
groups that succeed in achieving collective targets to measure the level of cooperation. We find that
when pure reward strategy is considered, the average group achievement value is 99:87%. This value is
much higher than the average group achievement of 56:60% induced by pure punishment strategy.
In order to further explore how the hybrid incentive strategy influences the group achievement and to find
the optimal weight of incentives, we show the average group achievement hG as a function of a for different
values of risk r in Figure 2A. We find that the group achievement first grows fast and then increases slowly
when increasing the value of a. Thus, we can conclude that pure reward strategy can always do better
in improving the level of group achievement than other combinations of incentives. We note that here
c=b= 0:1 was used to obtain Figure 2A, but our findings remain valid for a broad range of c= b ratio.
We further present hG as a function of risk r for different values of a, as shown in Figure 2B. For the sake of
comparison, we also show the results when there is no incentive strategy (see black dash line). We find that
the level of group achievement increases as we increase r. Secondly, the introduction of incentive strategy2 iScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021












G = 99.87% G = 56.60%
Reward (α = 1) Punishment (α = 0)A B
Figure 1. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperators, defectors, and executors under local scheme with fixed
incentives
Here, the risk level is r = 0.2. In panel A, in the extreme case of a = 1, E becomes equivalent to a pure rewarding strategy,
while the other extreme case of a = 0, where E is a pure punisher, can be seen in panel B. The darker dots in the simplex
represent the regions where the population spends more time. Orange arrows represent the most likely direction of
evolution when the population leaves the current configuration, obtained by computing the gradient of selection. We set
the collective targetM to 75% of the group size. Local scheme is established when the number of executors exceeds 25%




Articleprovides better outcome compared to the traditional two-strategy case. Furthermore, when strategy E is
introduced, it is better to adjust the weight factor toward the pure rewarding case which can improve the
result further especially in the small risk region.
In addition to the risk of collective failure mentioned above, themutation rate m also plays an important role
in the evolution of cooperation (Santos and Pacheco, 2011; Vasconcelos et al., 2013). However, it is unclear
whether pure reward is still the optimal incentive strategy when individual mutation is considered as it in-
troduces exogenous behavioral changes. To answer this question, in Figure 2C, we show hG as a function of
m for three different values of a. We find that the group achievement first increases until reaching the
maximum, and then, it decreases with the increasing value of m for different a values. We find that when
the mutation value is high, the group achievement level reaches a certain value regardless of the value
of a, which corresponds to random play, but it is always the highest for a = 1, and this difference is the
most conspicuous for small mutation rates (see the inset of Figure 2C). Thus, we can conclude that our
main finding is robust against the introduction of mutation.
We further find that the success of pure rewarding strategy for fixed incentives is induced by the efficiency
of the institution. As shown in Figure 3A, the institution prevalence increases as we increase a for different
risk values of r. We further compute the average fine on defectors and the average reward on cooperators
and executors as presented in Figure 3B and observe that as the parameter a increases, the average reward
amount on cooperators and executors monotonically increases from zero. On the other hand, the average
fine amount on defectors first increases until reaching themaximum and then decreases with increasing the
value of a. We can find that for a = 1, executors and cooperators have the greatest evolutionary advantage
over defectors, which is most conductive to the institution prevalence and the group achievement.Flexible incentives under a local scheme
Beside fixed incentives, we can also apply flexible values imposed by the executor strategy where the actual
level depends on the number of E players. Furthermore, the success of their collective efforts is acknowl-
edged via an enhancement factor d (Sasaki and Unemi, 2011; Sasaki et al., 2012). Hence, an enhanced fine
and reward are distributed among defecting and cooperating players, respectively. In Figure 4, we first
show the stationary distribution and the gradient of selection for low and high enhancement factor valuesiScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021 3
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Figure 2. The average group achievement hG under local scheme with fixed incentives
Panel A shows hG as a function of a for three different values of r. The inset of panel A shows hG as a function of a, where
the value of a ranges from 0.4 to 1.0.
Panel B shows hG as a function of r in the cases without incentive strategy E and with three different weight factor values in
its presence.
Panel C shows hG as a function of m for three different values of a. The inset of panel c shows hG as a function of m, where
the value of m ranges from 0.001 to 0.01. Parameter values are Z = 100,N = 4, c = 0.1, b= 1, m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, and pe = 0:3




Articlein the extreme cases of a= 1 (pure reward) and a= 0 (pure punishment). As shown in Figure 4A, the entire
population will spend most time near configurations in which most individuals are cooperators when d is
low. Besides, we observe that most arrows flow to the vertex C and a few arrows point to vertex D. In Fig-
ure 4B, the flow of arrows is basically consistent with that observed in Figure 4A. However, the background
shadow area near vertex C in Figure 4A is significantly larger than the corresponding region in Figure 4B,
which suggests that pure reward strategy has an evolutionary advantage over pure punishment strategy in
improving the level of group achievement. For high enhancement factor of the institutional fund, the appli-
cation of pure reward makes the system more cooperative and the entire population spend most of the
time in the vicinity of the CE-edge, as shown in Figure 4C. Besides, most of the arrows in the simplex
flow to the regions near the C-corner. The corresponding simplex of pure punishment shown in Figure 4D
illustrates very clearly that the dark area is close to vertex D; hence, we can conclude that the usage of pure
reward strategy is more beneficial than the application of pure punishment strategy.
We also compute and add the average group achievement hG values to the simplexes, which also illustrate
clearly that pure reward performs better and this impact can be increased for a higher value of enhance-
ment factor of the institution pool. In the following, we present how the group achievement hG varies
with the value of a for different values of d in Figure 5A. This panel demonstrates clearly that the optimal
weight of incentives is a = 1, corresponding to the pure reward case. In particular, we find that for low
d (e.g., d = 2), the level of group achievement approaches zero for any value of a. However, for a larger
d value, the group achievement level grows as a increases and can be significantly improved when the value
of a is larger than an intermediate value.
We further present hG as a function of r for different values of a, as shown in Figure 5B. We also show the
results in the case when additional incentive strategy is absent (see black dash line). In general, the group
achievement level increases by enhancing the risk level r. Besides, we observe that the introduction of the
incentive strategy may elevate the value of hG, especially in the pure reward extreme case, but the improve-
ment is not as shocking as for the fixed incentives version, shown in Figure 2B. In Figure 5C, we show how
the group achievement hG varies with increasing the enhancement factor d for different values of a. In gen-
eral, the group achievement grows as we increase d, but the most remarkable improvement can be seen in
the pure reward limit at a = 1. Finally, we also explore the possible impact of mutation rate m on the group
achievement for three different values of a. As Figure 5D shows, the introduction of a small mutation rate
can promote the group achievement significantly. However, when the m becomes high, the group achieve-
ment level reaches a certain value regardless of the value of a. But, as previously stated, the best improve-
ment can be obtained again for pure reward strategy.
In order to explore why pure reward strategy is more beneficial to the group achievement than other
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Figure 3. The institution prevalence hI and the average reward and fine under local scheme with fixed incentives
Panel A shows hI as a function of a for three different values of r. Panel B shows the average fine on defectors and
the average reward on cooperators and executors as a function of a. Parameter values are Z = 100, N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1,




Articlea, as shown in Figure 6A. We find that for flexible incentives, the institution prevalence increases as the
weight factor increases for different values of d, which means that the hI value reaches the maximum for
a = 1. This indicates that the efficiency and prevalence of such institution can be best enhanced by the
pure reward strategy. In addition, we see that the average reward amount on cooperators and execu-
tors increases from zero as we increase the a value (Figure 6B). On the contrary, the average fine on
defectors slowly decreases and reaches to zero when a is one (Figure 6B). We then find that the evolu-
tionary advantage of cooperators and executors over defectors can be best promoted by the pure
reward strategy since their incentive difference can reach the maximum for a = 1, which can facilitate
the success of group achievement.DISCUSSION
In this study, we have introduced a combined incentive strategy to address the collective-risk social
dilemma game, where the corresponding players punish free-riders and reward cooperators simulta-
neously. The fundamental question is how to share available resources to execute these tasks. We have
found that pure reward strategy can lead to the highest level of group achievement, no matter whether
we apply fixed or flexible incentives for governing the commons. It was demonstrated that when the risk
value of collective failure, the mutation rate, or the enhancement factor for institutional sanctioning is
changed to some extent, our conclusion about the superiority of pure reward remains intact. Furthermore,
we stress that this finding is not only valid under a local scheme of sanctioning but also valid for flexible
incentives under global level of institutions (see supplemental information where the latter option is dis-
cussed in details). The comparison of the mentioned cases also reveals that the application of local incen-
tives works more efficiently.
Previous works have demonstrated the advantage of a polycentric governance approach in solving the col-
lective-risk social dilemma and found that the local scheme of sanctioning based on pool punishment is
more effective than that associated with a single, global one for providing better conditions both for coop-
eration to thrive and for ensuring the maintenance of such sanctioning (Vasconcelos et al., 2013; Green
et al., 2014; Cole, 2015). In our work, we also confirm this conclusion, and we further find that it is valid
not only for fixed but also for the case when incentives are flexible. Thus, our work has greatly extended
the validity of previous conclusions.
In our work, the incentives on cooperators and defectors are imposed by executors, a third combined strat-
egy introduced into the collective-risk social dilemma. This consideration of the enforcement strategy as a
voluntary enforcement involves a more complex three-strategy system. Indeed, this is a kind of a bottom-
up self-regulation for influencing the evolution of cooperation (Sugiarto et al., 2017). We stress that this
approach is different from the top-down-like incentive mechanism used in previous works (Chen et al.,
2015; Góis et al., 2019), in which cooperators can be rewarded and defectors can be punished directly
by external centralized institutions. These works have concluded that the adaptive hybridization of
incentives can best promote the evolution of cooperation both in the traditional public goods gameiScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021 5
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Figure 4. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperator, defector, and executor strategy under local scheme with flexible
incentives
The risk level is r = 0.35. Panels A and C show the case of pure reward (a = 1). Panels B and D show the case of pure
punishment (a = 0). Parameter values are Z = 100, N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1, m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, and d= 1:4 in panels A and B;




Article(Chen et al., 2015) and in the collective-risk social dilemma game (Góis et al., 2019). When we consider the
exogenous stability of these institutions, we find that pure reward strategy can better promote the evolu-
tion of cooperation than hybrid incentive strategies in the collective-risk social dilemma. This is because in
our framework the incentive budget on individuals is not constrained, and the evolutionary advantage of
cooperators and executors over defectors can be significantly promoted due to the maximal incentive dif-
ference induced by the pure reward strategy. Hence, the efficiency of institution can be best enhanced by
the pure reward strategy, and from an evolutionary perspective, we show how an incentive strategy can be
maintained as an endogenously chosen institution for cooperative governance of risky commons. Thus, our
work can enrich the knowledge of the emergence of institutions for governing the commons (Sigmund et
al., 2010; Vasconcelos et al., 2013; Dannenberg and Gallier, 2020).
Many research studies have demonstrated that reward or punishment is a viable approach in promoting the
evolution of public cooperation (Szolnoki et al., 2011; Sasaki and Unemi, 2011; Sasaki et al., 2012). However,
identifying the best way to distribute incentives remains an open question, given the difficulty in assessing
the advantages and disadvantages of each possibility in different scenarios (Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010; Szol-
noki and Perc, 2013). The majority of previous research studies addressing the ‘‘stick vs. carrot’’ manage-
ment strategy concluded that punishment is more effective than reward in sustaining common cooperation
in the conventional public goods game (Sigmund, 2007; Sasaki et al., 2012). However, the conventional6 iScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021


































































































Figure 5. The average group achievement hG under local scheme with flexible incentives
Panel A shows hG as a function of a for three different values of d. Panel B shows hG as a function of r in the cases without
incentive strategy E and with three different values of a. Panel C shows hG as a function of d for three different values
of a. Panel D shows hG as a function of m for three different values of a. Parameter values are Z = 100, N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1,
m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, and r = 0.2 in panel A; Z = 100, N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1, m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, and d= 2 in panel B; Z = 100,
N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1, m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, and r = 0.5 in panel C; Z = 100,N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1, m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, r = 0.2, and




Articlepublic goods game fails to capture the significant feature of many real social scenarios, such as climate
change (Green et al., 2014). In this work, instead of the conventional public goods game, we apply the col-
lective-risk social dilemma game which has been proved as a framework to investigate the inherent prob-
lems of collective cooperation regarding avoiding dangerous climate change and other problems of this
type (Santos and Pacheco, 2011), and we show that the optimal sanctioning policy is pure reward, nomatter
whether fixed or flexible incentives are considered. Thus, our work may unveil the effects of incentives on
cooperative governance of risky commons in a real scenario.
Stimulating some nations or regions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions is a fundamental task tomiti-
gate climate change. How to design effective incentive measures is particularly important for this purpose.
Since the Paris Agreement, we are witnessing the transformation of some countries’ environmental gover-
nance to high-quality management (Rogelj et al., 2016). The establishment of the bonus-penalty mecha-
nism, including giving appropriate compensation fees to emission reduction and imposing some fines on
areas where pollution emission exceeds the prescribed quantity, has effectively promoted coordinated
emission reduction (Xue et al., 2020). However, it is still unclear how to weigh rewards and punishments in
realistic yet complicated situations. Our research may provide some advices for policy makers from a theo-
retical perspective: pure reward is more effective than pure punishment and other hybrid incentive mea-
sures in achieving emission reduction targets, especially if the stability of the institution is of concern.Limitations of the study
The current study focuses on exploring the optimal incentive strategy in the scenario where the combination
of punishment and reward is involved. However, it still has some limitations, which could be
further extended. In this work, we consider the institution-type incentiveswithwhichpunishment and reward
are used. Indeed, there are some other types of incentives in the real society, and the implementation of
incentive strategies is not necessarily institutional (Van Lange et al., 2014; Perc et al., 2017). In the futureiScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021 7
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Figure 6. The institution prevalence hI and the average reward and fine under local scheme with flexible
incentives
Parameter values are Z = 100, N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1, m = 1=Z, pt = 0:03, and r = 0.2 in panel A; Z = 100, N = 4, c = 0.1, b = 1,




Articlework, we can thus consider different types of incentive strategies, e.g., social exclusion (Sasaki and Uchida,
2013) or different implementation ways of incentive, e.g., peer-type incentives (Hauert et al., 2007; Sigmund
et al., 2010). In a recent work (Han et al., 2021), it is shown that peer punishment is more efficient than peer
reward in promoting safety compliance and in mitigating the risk from artificial intelligence unsafe develop-
ment. However, it is unknownwhether pure reward strategy is still the best incentive strategy to promote the
evolution of cooperation when peer-type incentives are considered in the collective-risk social dilemmas. In
addition, in this work, we consider that whether incentives can beprovided or not depends on the number of
executors. Indeed, the number of cooperators can be used as a criterion to decidewhether or not to provide
incentives (Han andTran-Thanh, 2018). In this scenario, it is interesting to explore the optimal incentive strat-
egy for cooperative governance of risky commons. Moreover, implementation of local incentive requires
additional information, and hence, it is also necessary to consider the cost of information collection for ex-
ecutors. Therefore, it is worth further exploring how the introduction of observation cost or information
collection cost affects cooperative governance of risky commons (Szolnoki and Chen, 2015). Our work re-
veals that pure reward strategy is a more efficient incentive strategy for cooperative governance of risky
commons. This may result from that executors bear the cost of punishing defectors (Szolnoki and Perc,
2017), while the beneficiary of rewarding mechanism actually includes themselves, which needs to be veri-
fied in the future work. Indeed, considering second-order sanctions is important in the context of pool in-
centives (Fowler, 2005; Perc, 2012; Garcı́a and Traulsen, 2019), so it may also open an interesting research
avenue to explore the efficiency of incentives in the collective-risk social dilemma game. Previous studies
have shown that the existenceof second-order free-riders plays an important role in the emergenceof coop-
eration and institutions (Sigmund et al., 2010; Sasaki andUnemi, 2011; Szolnoki and Perc, 2017). Therefore, it
is worth investigating whether the introduction of second-order punishment and second-order reward can
improve cooperative governance of risk commons (Van Lange et al., 2014). Furthermore, our research ex-
plores the optimal incentive strategy by adjusting the fixed relative weight parameter for the combination
of punishment and reward. But indeed, this parameter can be time varying, depending on the population
states. On the other hand, on the premise of ensuring a sufficiently good outcome, how to optimize the cost
of providing incentives is another important issue of incentive design (Han and Tran-Thanh, 2018). Hence, it
is meaningful to investigate the optimal incentive strategy in this scenario by means of optimal control the-
ory or reinforcement learning approach (Wang et al., 2019; Ratliff et al., 2019). In this work, we have consid-
ered a well-mixed interaction where individuals perform random interactions. However, the interactions
among individuals are typically not random but rather that they are limited to a set of neighbors in a struc-
tured population, which could be described by a complex interaction network (Santos and Pacheco, 2011;
Szolnoki et al., 2011; Pinheiro et al., 2012; Szolnoki and Perc, 2013; Perc et al., 2017). Thus, it could be inter-
esting to explore the optimal incentive strategy in structured populations. We believe that future work
considering these extensions will be valuable and improve our understanding of the role of incentive stra-
tegies in cooperative governance of risk commons.
STAR+METHODS








B Data and code availability
d METHOD DETAILS
B Collective-risk social dilemma game
B Settings of fixed incentives
B Settings of flexible incentives
B Evolutionary dynamics
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.102844.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61976048 and
62036002) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors designed and performed the research as well as wrote the paper.
DECLARATION OF INTERESTS
The authors declare no competing interests.
Received: May 10, 2021
Revised: June 23, 2021
Accepted: July 8, 2021
Published: August 20, 2021REFERENCES
Barrett, S., and Dannenberg, A. (2012). Climate
negotiations under scientific uncertainty. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109, 17372–17378.
Cole, D.H. (2015). Advantages of a polycentric
approach to climate change policy. Nat. Clim.
Change 5, 114–118.
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., and Perc, M. (2012). Risk-
driven migration and the collective-risk social
dilemma. Phys. Rev. E 86, 036101.
Chen, X., Zhang, Y., Huang, T.-Z., and Perc, M.
(2014). Solving the collective-risk social dilemma
with risky assets in well-mixed and structured
populations. Phys. Rev. E 90, 052823.
Chen, X., Sasaki, T., Brännström, Å., and
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METHOD DETAILS
Collective-risk social dilemma game
We consider a finite well-mixed population of Z individuals. From the entire population, N individuals are
selected randomly to form a group for playing a collective-risk social dilemma game. In the group, each
individual has an endowment b at the beginning of game. Then, everyone decides whether or not to
contribute an amount c to the common pool. Furthermore, we require a minimum collective contribution
Mc (0<M%N) or a minimum number M of cooperators to ensure the benefit of everyone within the group.
According to the traditional setup, cooperators contribute to reach the collective target while defectors
not. If the collective target is not reached, all participants within the group will lose their remaining endow-
ments with probability r (0%r%1). Otherwise, individuals in the group retain their endowments. Notably,
the parameter r represents the risk level of collective failure (Santos and Pacheco, 2011).
Based on the above description, the payoffs of defectors and cooperators in a group having jC cooperators
and N jC defectors obtained from the game can be respectively written as
P0DðjCÞ = bQðjC MÞ+ ð1 rÞb½1QðjC MÞ ;
P0 ðj Þ = P0 ðj Þ  c ;C C D C
where QðxÞ is the Heaviside function, that is, QðxÞ= 0 if x < 0, being one otherwise.
In the following, we introduce a hybrid incentive strategy into the collective-risk social dilemma game and
define two different kinds of enforcing institutions. Namely, in the first case the imposed incentives are
fixed, while in the other case they are flexible.
Settings of fixed incentives
We then introduce a third strategy into the collective-risk social dilemma game, that is, an executor (E) who




Articlesanctioning pool at a cost pt . This makes it possible to punish free-riders and to reward cooperative players
simultaneously. Accordingly, when the number of executors exceeds the given threshold nE , each executor
imposes an a portion of pe as positive incentive on every cooperators, while 1 a portion of executive pool
serves to punish free-riders. Here, a represents the relative weight between positive and negative incen-
tives. In an extreme case, when a = 0, executors only choose to punish defectors and they become simple
punishers. This simplified situation was discussed in a work of Vasconcelos et al. (Vasconcelos et al., 2013).
In the other extreme situation, when a = 1, executors only choose to reward cooperators and E becomes a
simple rewarding strategy. To sum up our model, the payoffs of the competing strategies where jC coop-
erators and jE executors are present in the group can be written as
PDðjC ; jEÞ = P0DðjC + jEÞ  ð1aÞpeD;
P ðj ; j Þ = P0 ðj + j Þ+ap D c;C C E D C E ePEðjC ; jEÞ = P0DðjC + jEÞ+apeD c  pt ;
where D corresponds to the sanction function, which relies on whether the sanction is local or global. When
the local scheme is considered, D is given by QðjE  nEÞ, which means that the enforcement is executed
at the group level if the number of executors in the group is not less than the group threshold. However,
when the global scheme is considered, D = QðiE  nEÞ, which means that incentives are applied in the
whole population if the total number of executors iE is not less than the corresponding threshold level.Settings of flexible incentives
Alternatively, the level of incentive pe may not be fixed but may depend on the number of executors. For
instance, the institutional pool may behave as a typical public goods pool and its impact can be propor-
tional to the simple sum of individual contributions pe of executor players with an enhancement
factor d>1. Notably, in the full reward extreme case this idea was used in one previous work (Sasaki and
Unemi, 2011). More importantly, in our extended model we do not just apply a combined incentives strat-
egy, but we still hold the collective-risk feature of the institutional pool. Therefore, as previously, the appli-
cation of incentives depends sensitively on whether the nE threshold number of executors are present or
not. Hence, the modified payoff values for flexible incentives are
PDðjC ; jEÞ = P0DðjC + jEÞ  ð1aÞ ptdjEN jC  jE D;
p djPCðjC ; jEÞ = P0DðjC + jEÞ+a t EjC + jE D c;
p djPEðjC ; jEÞ = P0DðjC + jEÞ+a t EjC + jE D c  pt :
Evolutionary dynamics
The average payoffs of the aforementioned strategies in a configuration i = ðiC ;iE ;iDÞ, characterized by the
number of cooperators iC , the number of executors iE , and the number of defectors iD = Z  iC  iE , can be
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To describe how individuals adopt new strategies over time, we consider a stochastic process of pairwise
comparison (Van Segbroeck et al., 2012). In each evolutionary time step, a randomly chosen individual with
strategy L adopts the strategy R of another randomly selected individual from the population with proba-
bility 1=½1 +ebðfRfLÞ, where the parameter b corresponds to the intensity of selection (Szabó and T}oke,
1998). For b/0, we have random drift, while for b/N the imitation process is more inclined to
prefer the strategies that yield higher payoffs (Sigmund et al., 2010). Without loss of generality, we set
up b = 5:0, meaning that it is very likely that the better performing players will pass their strategy to others,
yet it is also possible that players will occasionally learn from a less successful individual. This setting is also
consistent with the previous work (Vasconcelos et al., 2013). We would like to stress that our main results
remain valid when the value of b is changed appropriately (see Figure S5 in supplemental information).
In addition to the imitation, we also allow strategy mutation, and we assume that an individual adopts a
different randomly selected strategy with probability m. Accordingly, the transition probability between
strategies R and L under the above mutation-selection process can be written as











where iL (iR ) represents the number of individuals with strategy L (R) in the population. Therefore, for a given
configuration i = ðiC ;iE ;iDÞ, the probability that the number of cooperators increases or decreases by one in
the entire population is written as
TCGi = TðiCG1;iEH1;iD Þ +TðiCG1;iE ;iDH1Þ :
Similarly, the probability that the number of executors increases or decreases by one is given by
TEGi = TðiCH1;iEG1;iD Þ +TðiC ;iEG1;iDH1Þ :
Since the strategy update process depends only on the current configuration of the system, the associated
evolutionary dynamics can be described as aMarkov process over a two-dimensional space (Kampen, 2007)








Here Tii0 denotes the transition probability from the configuration i
0 to i per unit time t (Imhof et al., 2005).
Accordingly, we can obtain the so-called stationary distribution piðtÞ, by searching the eigenvector associ-
ated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transition matrix T= ½TijT (Kampen, 2007). As an important quantity for
describing the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in the system, the stationary distribution can charac-
terize the fraction of time that the population spends in each possible configuration of the finite population.
In addition to the stationary distribution piðtÞ, another central quantity for describing the evolutionary dy-
namics of strategies is the gradient of selection Vi, which describes the most likely evolutionary path of
change of population configuration with time. Employing the Kramers-Moyal expansion of the Master







TE +i  TEi
	
uE ;
where uC and uE are unit vectors defining as a basis of the two dimensional simplex.
Furthermore, in order to investigate the role of different sanctioning policies, we provide a key quantity
aGðiÞ to compute the fraction of groups that reach a given threshold, that is, the collective target (Vascon-
celos et al., 2013). We should compute the average group achievement from the perspective of the
entire population and not obtain the value for groups centered on a given C, E, or D. For each possible
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ArticleSubsequently, by using aGðiÞ combined with the stationary distribution piðtÞ, we can calculate the average
group achievement hG as an important quantity which refers to the average proportion of groups that




We further compute the fraction of groups that reach nE executors for local institution or whether a global
institution can be formed for the configuration i. Accordingly, we should compute the institution preva-
lence from the perspective of the entire population and not obtain the value for groups centered on a given
















Z  iC  iE
N jC  jE

D :
We subsequently use aIðiÞ combined with the stationary distribution piðtÞ to compute the institution prev-
alence hI averaging over all possible configuration i, which is given as hI =
P
i
piaIðiÞ.14 iScience 24, 102844, August 20, 2021
